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2Introduction
New Labour’s accession marked a shift in government assumptions about gender. Under 
earlier Labour governments, education and health legislation had given crucial 
citizenship rights to women and men equally (which women seized to participate fully as 
citizens) while the 1970s brought equal opportunities and sex discrimination legislation. 
These brought women into employment and public life, but the male breadwinner model 
of the family lingered through aspects of Thatcher and Major government policy until 
1997. Women might join the labour market, become MPs and ministers, but they should 
not expect government support in challenging gender relations at home, or through any 
national system of childcare. New Labour had new ideas about gender, with a more 
liberal attitude to varied family forms, a strong expectation that women’s responsibilities 
lay in employment as well as parenting, that they should be expected to support 
themselves and their children and pay for their own pensions. New Labour has 
acknowledged the extent of change in families, and the need for women to sustain more 
independent employment and incomes. It developed a Work/Life Balance agenda for 
economic reasons, to avoid social exclusion and support families, though rarely for 
gender equality (Lewis and Campbell 2007a and b).
How strongly has New Labour supported gender equality? If the male breadwinner model 
was an inter-related system of employment, care, time, income and power, how far in 
practice have women been enabled to support themselves and their children through 
equality in employment and working time, with social support for care and gender 
equality in care? How does gender equality in the UK measure against Sweden, where 
gender equality has been a passion, and supports for dual earner families long-standing? I
argue that policy for women’s employment has not been matched by policies in other 
areas. Care has been next with Sure Start, Childcare Tax Credits and rights for pre-school 
children, but a long way to go before we could describe a ‘universal service’. Gender 
inequality in time is crucial: on average, women are now only half of a one-and-a-half 
breadwinner model. Policies for flexible working are aimed mainly at mothers, but 
policies for more equal time are nowhere on the agenda. And income? The tax credit 
system recognizes lone mothers’ needs to earn and to care for children, bringing rights as 
part-timers, rather than being treated either as mothers or as workers. But important 
change for lone mothers is balanced by potentially negative impact among partnered 
mothers.  Women’s incomes are still not equivalent to men’s and few can earn 
themselves equality in income or pensions. New Labour has also been limited by its 
liberal, free-market stance. A commitment in principle to universal childcare services has 
not brought real public spending on the Scandinavian, or even Central European model. 
There are reasons to turn to social democracy, and unembarrassed public spending on 
childcare as the underpinning for more complete equality of citizenship in the UK.
Models of gender in social policy
How far have New Labour governments moved from the gender assumptions of the 
‘male breadwinner model’ towards gender equality? The UK was described as a male 
breadwinner model in Jane Lewis’ path-breaking comparative account in 1992, with 
policies rooted in post-war ideas of gender difference, in contrast to a modified version in 
France, and dual earner model developing in Sweden (Lewis 1992, 2001). Changes in 
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policy, with New Labour committed from 1997 to enhancing women’s – especially 
mothers’ - access to employment. At the millennium, women’s lifetime earnings have 
been measured at half men’s (Rake 2000). But being the half in a one- and-a-half earner 
partnership exposes women to great risks. The need for independent earning grows, as 
decreasing marriage and increasing divorce mean women are losing security through 
male breadwinners: the proportion of non-employed individuals who have a partner in 
work decreased continuously from 76% in 1974 to 40% in 1994 and has remained at that 
level (Berthoud & Blekesaune 2006: 21).
The characterization of gender regimes based on the male breadwinner/dual earner 
spectrum (Lewis 1992) puts gender at the centre of comparative analysis and is a starting 
point here. Gender regimes are understood as systems of gender equality or inequality 
through which paid work is connected to unpaid, state services and benefits are delivered 
to individuals or households, costs are allocated, and time is shared between men and 
women in households and between households and employment. The decline of the male
breadwinner model has implications for all these (Lewis 2001). But changing gender 
assumptions in government and society have neither brought changing practice in all 
these domains, nor mean that gender equality has been prioritized. New Labour gender 
policies are analyzed here in component parts of the male breadwinner/dual earner 
system: paid work, care work, time, income and power, asking to what extent policies 
and practices can be seen as systems of gender equality or of traditional gender roles in 
each part.
We should also ask about the level and nature of policy intervention. The Three Worlds 
of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990) are relevant to gender, because social 
democratic countries have had gender equality as well as social equality at their heart 
(Ellingsaeter & Leira 2006). Social democratic regimes have also underpinned gender 
equality with social policies, social spending and social commitment to parents and 
children. In the UK, commitment to free markets may be greater than commitment to
gender equality.
Are there alternative scenarios for a more gender equal future? The idea of making men’s 
lives more like women’s is central to Fraser’s Universal Caregiver model: all employees 
would be assumed to have care responsibilities, while developing civil society would 
share care more widely (Fraser 1997). But gender equality needs more systematic 
support, beyond the capacity of civil society. The French working time model also has 
something to contribute to thinking about how to turn the one and a half earner model 
into a two x three-quarter one in which men and women have time to care as well as to 
earn. Government commitments to gender equality need underpinning with regulation of 
time and with social investment. Comparative data clearly show social democratic 
countries as the most gender equal: but they have still prioritized women’s employment 
over men’s care.  In a model of Universal Citizenship gender equality would go beyond 
paid employment – important as that has been – and attend to gender inequalities in care, 
time and power: men’s and women’s obligations to paid work and care as citizens would
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investment in citizenship rights.
Gender in employment
Increasing labour market participation has been a key government policy, for social 
inclusion, for economic growth, for responsibility, and as a basis for citizenship rights 
(Lister 2002). Women have chosen paid employment too, seeking economic 
independence and autonomy. Increasing support for reconciling employment and family 
has benefited women and men. The emphasis on paid work as the only recognized work 
may be criticized for under-valuing unpaid care work, and for attending inadequately to 
the impact of care on women’s independent access to earnings and pensions. We need to 
ask about the quality of women’s work as well as the quantity. And we need to ask about 
gender equality. Governments everywhere hold to gender equality in principle, and pass 
legislation promoting it. But it often competes with other objectives, and may be little 
supported in practice. Have New Labour policies been underpinned by an ideology of 
gender equality, and how vigorously have they promoted gender equality in practice?
Women’s increasing labour market participation pre-dates New Labour policies. Women 
have been making their own decisions for paid employment, in the absence of policies to 
support them. By 1997, lone mothers’ labour market participation was lower than 
elsewhere, but employment among other mothers was high. Conservative ideological 
support for the family as a private domain, for a male breadwinner model and for family 
responsibility meant mothers were making their own policies, bringing deep divisions 
between those with education, able to earn to pay for childcare, and lower earners who 
fitted employment around care responsibilities. New Labour brought a new ideological 
commitment to employment and some policies intended to sustain women’s participation. 
These include the Childcare Strategy (discussed below under care), a New Deal for lone 
parents, Working Tax Credits, Child Tax Credits with a childcare component. Some 
measures to improve the quality of employment include strengthened employment 
protection for parents and for part-time workers. The National Minimum Wage aimed to 
lift low earnings, with particular relevance to women’s low earnings, while the Women’s 
Unit was established in central government to support women’s causes, including 
employment and pay.
The Women’s Unit documenting gender differences in lifetime earnings showed 
women’s lifetime earnings as around half men’s, a practice aptly described as a one-and-a 
half male breadwinner, in which women’s labour market participation does not bring 
equality in earnings or equal domestic partnerships (Lewis 2001). The WU study showed 
great differences between mothers and other women, and between women with different 
levels of education (Rake 2000). If a study published in 2000 could be seen as describing 
mainly the legacy inherited by New Labour what has happened since? Have the many 
initiatives around work, especially women’s work, brought better quality, more 
continuous employment? Have conditions and rewards of part-time work improved?
The undervaluation of women’s work is widespread, complex and dynamic (Grimshaw 
and Rubery 2007). Even new women graduates receive lower rates of pay than their male 
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segregated and job hierarchies within occupations gendered; men’s power is built into the 
male working life model, favouring male jobs and working patterns. Long working hours 
make it difficult for women to return to full-time work after childbirth. Flexible patterns 
of work may favour women, but they may also be organised to favour employers, 
keeping workers on call, and unable to reconcile work and family responsibilities. 
Women have improved their educational resources, and now compete on more equal 
terms in some occupations. But as jobs feminize their relative pay may decline. And 
increasing social and economic inequality may be associated with gender, reinforcing 
gender inequality among low-paid workers. Over time, the gender pay gap for full-time
workers has decreased. But the UK has – compared with other EU countries – a very high 
proportion of women in part-time work, many of whom are deeply disadvantaged, with 
very low pay and very short hours. Their pay gap has decreased scarcely at all (Grimshaw 
2007, Grimshaw and Rubery 2007).
The gender pay gap has been closing over time, with a clear trend established since the 
1980s. The ratio of women’s pay to men’s increased from 66% in 1984 to 73% in 2003. 
But New Labour’s election in 1997 was ‘not a catalyst for rapid improvements in 
women’s pay; more damning, women’s gains were far more substantial under the 
Conservatives during the 1987-95 period’ (Grimshaw 2007: 135). The latter part of the 
Labour government has seen improvements again, with an increase to 77% in 2005. The 
National Minimum Wage has been a key strategy for lifting wages at the bottom, and 
New Labour’s proud boast. But it was set very low and has failed to narrow the gap or lift 
women’s incomes to a living wage. Grimshaw argues that New Labour has failed to 
examine labour market policies for their part in the gender pay gap (emphasizing instead 
more individual and cultural factors such as girls’ choices in education); it has allowed a 
two-tier workforce to develop before co-operating with trade unions in its third term to 
improve the position of low-paid part-time women workers; improving women’s pay has 
conflicted with other policies, especially using a household means-test for tax credit 
assessments and the privatisation of public services; and governments have been wary of 
policies against widening wage differentials (Grimshaw 2007: 150).
Women’s employment rates are compared with men’s in Table 1, and with other 
European countries, representing those with a long-standing dual earner tradition in the 
social democracies of Sweden and Denmark and countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(Slovenia and Hungary), where women’s full-time employment has had strong 
government support. France, described as a modified male breadwinner system (Lewis 
1992) because women could choose between employment and care, is included, as are 
countries which retain a strong male breadwinner tradition, Ireland and Malta. The 
percentage of women employed (at a very low threshold of 1-hour per week) is 65.9 in 
the UK – somewhat above the EU27 average, while the employment gap between men 
and women is 11.7% and somewhat below the EU27 average. But the UK is more 
unequal in this respect than the social democracies, with Swedish women’s employment 
rates are only 4% behind men’s.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
6Women’s employment participation was already increasing, with little government
support. It has been targeted by New Labour, in a clear ideological shift from the male 
breadwinner model, whose ideas were entrenched in government policies and 
assumptions in the post-war period and only a little modified by interim governments.
Quality and equality in employment have both been targets, as governments have 
implemented policies to improve pay through the National Minimum Wage, conditions of 
part-time workers and a gender equality duty for public sector authorities. But these have 
not been enough to eliminate gender differences in the quality of jobs or pay, or other 
rewards from employment, in the context of widening social and economic inequalities.
Gendered care
Childcare as public responsibility – rather than belonging privately to families – was a 
key change of principle under New Labour. By 2004, Gordon Brown was arguing that 
‘the early part of the twenty first century should be marked by the introduction of pre-
school provision for the under fives and childcare available to all’ (Gordon Brown, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Comprehensive Spending Review). Commitment to social 
investment broke a long-established rule, bringing a Manifesto commitment to 
‘universal’ childcare (Labour 2005: 76). Change in the means by which policy goals have 
been brought about has been incremental but there was a clear change of ideology (Lewis 
2007b).
Sure Start brought childcare together with other children’s services to disadvantaged 
areas: these are to be more widely spread in new children’s centres. The childcare 
component of Child Tax Credit, assisting employed parents with formal childcare costs, 
currently includes employed families earning up to £59,000 per year. Third is public 
funding for pre-school places for all 3- and 4-year olds.
Are there problems with these strategies? Despite unprecedented commitment from HM 
Treasury to children and childcare, the system relies on the unreliable: private providers 
who do not necessarily respond to government incentives, and 17.7 per cent of whom 
went out of business in the year to 2004 (HM Treasury and DTI 2004: 15). Scandinavian 
countries offer a more ‘universal’ model, with government provision, higher spending, 
well trained staff, and low costs to parents. As in the UK, Scandinavian parents may not 
always have their expectations met, but there is a more comprehensive framework, with
high quality childcare as a social norm and social provision for children after parental 
leave and before school. This is underpinned by a passion for gender equality as well as
for social equality (Ellingsaeter and Leira (eds) 2006). Both these commitments could be 
said to be more half-hearted under New Labour governments.
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
Comparison of childcare arrangements is difficult, some countries having strong 
support for parental leave, while others have nursery provision for 0-3 year-olds; pre-
school is key, but may be seen as education rather than childcare. The EU has begun 
the task of comparing: we can now cautiously assess how comprehensive is the 
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government spending (Plantenga & Siegel 2005). Table 2 shows the UK system as 
very partial, with limited coverage and long gaps between the end of ‘effective leave’ 
and pre-school admission.  For 3-5 year-olds, the UK’s very short part-time hours 
compare unfavourably with other European countries. Even where pre-school 
education is part-time elsewhere, opening hours may be longer: for example, 
Denmark’s pre-school system provides part-time education (3-6 hours per day) but 
facilities are open from 7am to 5/6 pm for leisure activities. Slovenia, with much 
lower per capita GDP than the UK, has pre-school opening hours from 6am to 5pm 
(Plantenga & Siegel 2005). New Labour plans to increase the scope of pre-school 
places from the current 2.5- hour day to a 3-hour day by 2010, giving a 15-hour week 
in term-time (with a long-term prospect of a 20-hour week (HM Treasury and DTI 
2004). Meanwhile, the 2.5-hour day is too little acknowledged as a source of maternal 
pressure and gender inequality in the labour market.
There has been real increase in spending and commitment to childcare. There are plans 
and promises to bring out-of-school childcare places for 3-14 year olds between 8am and 
6pm on weekdays (HM Treasury and DTI 2004: 1).  But these debates show how far the 
UK is from a universal system of childcare. Despite unprecedented concern with 
women’s labour market participation, work-family reconciliation for parents, investment 
in children through quality services, social inclusion of parents and children, we still have 
a 2.5 hour day for pre-school children, forcing parents (usually mothers) to patchwork 
care arrangements if they are to use the time for jobs.
We may also ask how much New Labour policies have enabled parents to care for their 
own children, and in particular about the gender implications of parental leave policies: 
do they aim to change the gender relations of care, bringing fathers into care, as 
employment policies have aimed to bring mothers into employment?
Leave systems have become an important aspect of New Labour’s Work/Family balance 
agenda (Lewis 2007a).  Maternity leave with Statutory Maternity Pay has increased from 
fourteen weeks to six months. Mothers can take an extra six months’ unpaid leave, which 
will be paid leave from 2010. The level of maternity pay has nearly doubled, while 
maternity allowance has improved entitlements to mothers not entitled to the contributory 
Statutory Maternity Pay. These are important developments supporting mothers’ care for 
children in the first year of life.
Policies to enable fathers’ involvement in care have come slowly under New Labour, 
while the support has been modest and encouragement non-existent. Adopting the 1996 
European Parental Leave Directive brought fathers’ entitlement to care time (three 
months but unpaid) after the birth of a child, as well as mothers’. But this minimalist 
approach (Lewis 2007b), with entitlement to unpaid leave, was followed by further, 
somewhat reluctant, support to new fatherhood in April 2003, when two weeks paid 
paternity leave was introduced, paid at the same level as Statutory Maternity Pay (now 
£108.85 per week). Under the 2006 Work and Families Act, mothers will be able to 
transfer their right to maternity leave  - after the first six months - to fathers, who will 
then be entitled to take six months’ ‘additional paternity leave’.
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work and family for mothers, there are limitations, particularly in comparison with 
Scandinavian countries, and particularly in relation to fathers. European data, drawing 
maternity leaves into parental leaves for comparative purposes, and allowing for the level 
of payment, suggest that ‘effective parental leave’ in the UK is actually rather short (see 
Table 2). By this measure Sweden has 119 and Hungary 114 weeks of parental leave, 
while the UK has 25. This measure puts the UK among the lowest group of parental leave 
providers in Europe. The UK also has one of the longest gaps between the end of 
effective parental leave and pre-primary School Admission Age, with 131 weeks, 
compared with 38 weeks in Hungary and 30 in Sweden (Plantenga & Siegel 2005: 10-11)
(See Table 2).
Norway has been developing stronger entitlements to paid, non-transferable Daddy leave 
to encourage fathers’ care. Sweden borrowed this policy in 1995, increasing Norway’s 
one month to two in 2002. Currently, Iceland has the most developed and effective
policy, with a 3 x 3 system: three months for the mother, three for the father, and three 
for sharing between them. These policies have encouraged a rapid increase in fathers’
taking a share of parental leave, with three-quarters taking their three-month quota. 
Scandinavian parents are subject to contradictory pressures too, to work long hours, and 
fathers still take only a small proportion of parental leaves in Nordic countries, (Nyberg
2006, Ellingsaeter and Leira 2006, Lammi-Taskula 2006). However modest in effect, 
these are important changes, bringing new assumptions about men as fathers, in 
households as well as among policy-makers.
In the UK, policy ideas and future plans still entrench mothers’ responsibility for care 
rather than fathers’. Fathers may lag behind mothers in taking responsibility for care, but 
most fathers see themselves as responsible (Fahey and Spéder 2004), around 80% take 
some leave (Smeaton 2006, Smeaton and Marsh 2006, Dex and Ward 2007) and –
especially in full-time dual earner households - spend time on childcare (O’Brien 2005).
In free-market countries fathers may contribute more time to their children, in response to 
an absence of social support (Smith 2004, Smith and Williams 2007). In all these respects 
they are ahead of New Labour governments, which have emphasized women’s and men’s
responsibility for work rather than men’s responsibility for care.
After ten years, New Labour had established a coherent work/family balance agenda 
giving employed mothers rights to parental leave during the first year, with support for 
childcare – including free part-time pre-school places. There were important limitations: 
services were ‘highly fragmented and unstable’ (Lewis 2007a: 13). Problems of quality, 
trustworthiness, supply and affordability to parents still encourage discontinuous and 
part-time employment, especially among less qualified mothers (Hansen 2006). And 
fathers are nowhere in New Labour’s frame of reference.
Gendered time
Women’s increasing labour market participation has been encouraged and enabled by 
New Labour: but the male breadwinner model remains entrenched in unequal working 
lives. If the pay gap for full-time work were closed tomorrow, even – much more 
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we could also bring more equal working time. Gender differences in working time are 
particularly marked for parents, with fathers likely to work long hours, while mothers are 
likely to work short part-time ones. Working time preferences, on the other hand, are for 
more equal working time between men and women (Fagan 2003).
Flexible working has been a key element of New Labour Work/Life Balance policies. 
These began in 2003 with rights to request flexible working for parents of children under 
school-age (under 18 where children are disabled) and were extended to carers of adults 
under the 2006 Work and Families legislation, with further extension to parents of older 
children currently promised.  Policies have been developed cautiously, seeking agreement 
with business, persuading employers and employers’ organizations that flexible working 
could be developed in their interests as well as parents’ interests. Policies have aimed at 
gender-neutrality rather than gender equality. As it is mothers more than fathers who 
currently make their lives flexible to meet children’s needs, more women than men have 
requested flexible working, and most requests have been accepted. These rights have 
been used by around a quarter of parents with young children, and have been accepted by 
business organizations and by parents as enabling employment and reconciliation of work 
and families. The notion that employees have family responsibilities which employers 
should acknowledge has contributed to changing employment culture: mothers – and to a 
smaller extent fathers - have benefited from increasing rights and changing expectations
(Lewis and Cambell 2007a).
But regulating working time is another matter: there is no suggestion here of changing 
working culture, a move towards more rights, more family-friendly hours, or of gender 
equality as an ambition. New Labour has developed its time policies within a framework 
of individual choice. It has argued for freedom for companies and for employees, to 
choose working hours. This model of individual choice ignores the joint responsibilities 
and decision-making of parents: where parents have dependent children, fathers’ choices 
impact on mothers’ choices. Long working hours also prevent mothers from taking on 
more responsible jobs (Fox, Pascall & Warren 2006). New Labour inherited – and retains 
-  an opt-out from the European Union’s Working Time Directive, giving individuals the 
right to opt out of the 48-hour week: the UK is the only member state not enforcing the 
Working Time Directive. The number of people working more than 48 hours has been 
increasing (Coates and Oettinger 2007: 127).
What routes are there to more equal working time? Three routes in other European 
countries could be characterized as Sweden making women’s working lives as far as 
possible like men’s, the Netherlands making men’s working lives more like women’s, 
while France offers a mid-point between men’s lives and women’s. The Swedish route 
has been to support full-time employment – or nearly full-time employment - for women 
and men within a dual earner model, through high public spending on childcare and 
parental leaves. The Netherlands has pursued a part-time route: the ‘Polder model’ 
developed to share employment through encouraging part-time work, while the social 
ideal of the ‘Combination Scenario’ aims to allow men and women equally to combine 
paid and unpaid work, which should be equally shared and equally valued (Plantenga 
2002: 53-4). Finally France has legislated for a maximum 35-hour week for everyone. As 
in the Netherlands, this started as a policy to share employment, at a time of high 
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unemployment, but more equal sharing of paid and unpaid work in families was also an 
objective (Fagnani & Letablier 2006).
Comparative data in Table 3 show that across that across the EU around one third of 
women’s employment is part-time, which is nearly five times the rate for men. UK 
women’s rate of 42% is well above the European average, but UK women are also 
disadvantaged by the extent to which they work short part-time hours for low pay. Part-
time work is not a feature in Central and Eastern Europe, with only 5.8% of women in 
Hungary employed this way. The Netherlands, where part-time work has been 
encouraged, has 75.1% of women employed part-time and 22.6% of men. The table also 
shows full-time male working hours in the UK at 44 per week, three hours above the EU 
average, and four hours above women’s full-time hours. But UK men and women are 
also likely to work very long hours, with 18% above 48 hours (Eurostat 2007). These 
comparisons show the UK retaining gender inequality in working time, leading to 
unequal earnings and unequal pensions.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
New Labour has made both ideological and practical changes in relations between work 
and family, through employment and Work/Family Balance policies, which have enabled 
women’s increasing labour market participation and attachment. It has recognized 
changing families as bringing a need to combine motherhood and employment, among 
lone parents and among couples. Parental rights to ask for flexible working time have 
been used, and are clearly of use to mothers of young children, and some fathers of young 
children. These policies have had employment rather than gender equality at their heart: 
they pose some risks of entrenching the different working lives of men and women.
Meanwhile they have ignored key gender differences in working time. Gender equality in 
access to security and earnings depends on more equal working time. While the gender 
pay gap for full-timers has reduced, gender inequality in working time – including career 
breaks and part-time work - has become a more serious factor in women’s ability to 
support themselves. It has also become a more serious difference between women who 
can afford to pay for care they can trust, and those who cannot. But gender equality has 
not been the guiding commitment in these work-life balance policies. Reducing the 
working week would mainly limit men’s working hours – but would enable mothers to 
sustain more continuous working lives. While embracing flexibility, New Labour has
rejected regulation to limit the working week.
Gendered income
At the heart of the Beveridge system were assumptions that men would earn enough 
through paid employment to support families, and women would be dependent on men’s 
earnings and pension contributions. Insecurities in families have increased. Women have 
increasingly figured as employees and contributors to social security. But the system 
devised in the 1940s was based upon men’s working lives. Women have joined the 
labour market, but women’s working lives have been characterized by discontinuity, part-
time employment and low pay. Women’s lack of independent pensions has emerged in 
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debates leading to the Pensions Act in 2007 as a continuing problem of the Beveridge 
framework. Until 1997, lone mothers fell outside the male breadwinner assumptions, and 
were particularly likely to be on means-tested benefits. So tax credits for lone parents, 
including childcare tax credits, on a basis that assumes and allows part-time work 
combined with care, represent a radical transformation of the male breadwinner model.
There are plenty of reasons for pensions to be on the social policy agenda: the ageing 
population, inadequate savings, whether through personal pensions (dating from the 
Thatcher years), company pensions, or state pensions. While the question of how to 
produce enough savings to keep pensioners out of poverty is on the agenda, the gender 
dimensions have been too little debated (Bellamy and Rake 2005). National Insurance 
pensions, occupational pensions, personal pensions or savings: everywhere men’s 
contributions earn more entitlements than women’s. As cohabiting partners and wives, 
women may be included in any of these arrangements, and the allocation of pension 
rights on divorce is now more likely to acknowledge unpaid work in women’s 
contribution to marriage. But gender differences in working lives bring gender 
differences in entitlements to pensions, putting women at greater risk of poverty.
The core National Insurance pension entitlement in the UK is the Basic State Pension. 
But whereas nearly all men retire with the full state pension in their own right, a minority 
of women do so. Older women may have taken the Married Woman’s Option to opt out 
of National Insurance, because they would be covered through their husbands, as indeed, 
some are: a wife may receive a pension at a percentage of her husband’s rate and be 
entitled to inherit his pension rights. Others may lack entitlement because of low pay, 
below the lower earnings limit for contributions, and/or because care responsibilities have 
limited their labour market attachment and reduced entitlements. For all these reasons the 
full Basic State Pension was received by only 23% of women reaching 60 in September 
2004, while on average those reaching 60 in 2005/6 have 70% of a full Basic Pension 
(DWP 2005: 73). The DWP argues that the figures are changing rapidly because of 
women’s increasing labour market participation, and the effects of Home Responsibilities 
Protection, introduced in 1978 to protect the Basic Pension rights of those caring for a 
child under 17 by reducing the number of years needed to qualify. The DWP has 
defended the contributory system, on the grounds that women in their early forties or 
younger are accruing pension rights equivalent to men and by 2025 over 80% of women 
reaching pension age will be entitled to a full basic state pension (DWP 2005: 66-82). But 
this solution will not meet the needs of those retiring before 2025. There are problems at 
the heart of the National Insurance Scheme, designed in the post-war era around men’s 
working lives and secure families. Most women’s working lives have been interrupted 
and low paid. Falling marriage rates and higher divorce rates, with now half of all 
marriages ending in divorce, mean that the Beveridgean model, which built women’s 
dependency on men into the welfare state, is not a secure framework for women’s 
pensions. The 2007 Pensions Act does bring better recognition for those whose working 
lives are interrupted by care, with qualifying years for the basic pension reduced to thirty, 
and a new system of credits in the National Insurance System. A universal citizens’ 
pension would be a more radical solution to a system too much designed around men’s 
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lives: the cutting and pasting of the insurance system so far leaves 77% of women 
reaching 60 unable to claim a full Basic State Pension.
New Labour’s response to pensioner poverty is to means test, to focus pension guarantees 
on the poorest pensioners. There is now a Pension Credit, paying around £40 per week to 
around 3.2 million households, with an income guarantee, currently £109 per week. In 
many ways this benefits women, whose life expectancy is greater than men’s and who 
have a high risk of poverty in old age: they have been two-thirds of the recipients of 
Minimum Income Guarantees. But the Department for Work and Pensions estimates that 
between 22 per cent and 36 per cent of entitled pensioners do not claim.
If the means test – a classic liberal welfare state response to poverty – is the current 
solution for pensions, so has New Labour brought tax credits as a core strategy for 
encouraging work and reducing poverty. It has been extended since April 2003, with 
Child Tax Credits paid to 90% of families, and Working Tax Credits, aimed at rather 
fewer. The new system splits the payment between carer and worker: now Child Tax 
Credit is paid to the main carer and addresses child poverty, while Working Tax Credit 
offers the incentive to work (Bennett 2005). The Child Tax Credits are now a major part 
of the government’s anti-poverty strategy, and ‘the biggest ever state boost to mothers’ 
incomes’ (Toynbee and Walker 2005: 71). The universal system of child benefit, paid on 
behalf of all children, remains. Hilary Land comments that we now have the closest thing 
to the Inland Revenue’s claim ‘single seamless system’ of support for families with 
children that Britain has ever experienced (Land 2004: 4).
There remain serious problems in accessing childcare. But for lone mothers, Working 
Tax Credit, incorporating an element for childcare, and Child Tax Credit, which they 
receive whether employed or not, bring real choice about balancing work and care: they 
can receive support if they work 16 hours, or more support if they work 30. This allows a 
shorter working week to be supplemented through tax credits, and may enable lone 
parents, who are mostly mothers, to lift themselves and their children out of poverty, and 
keep a foot in the labour market, while keeping time for care.
For mothers with partners, the Tax Credit system has more mixed implications. The 
Child Tax Credit brings material support for children and childcare. But there are 
concerns about joint taxation, with the Tax Credit system built on household means tests.
Mothers will face high rates of marginal taxation/tax credit loss, bringing disincentives to 
employment (Bennett 2005). Mothers in couples are also more likely to pay childcare 
costs; 80% of costs is the maximum proportion covered by credits. It is also targeted on 
smaller families, making childcare costs a significant barrier to work for mothers in larger 
families (Land 2004).
The Beveridge system was designed in the post-war era around gender difference, with 
women expected to achieve social security through their husbands’ employment. As 
families have destabilized, and women have joined the labour market, governments have 
changed the rules, to account – in some measure – for women’s need for social security 
as individuals and as parents, with or without men. But the male model of working life 
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still lurks beneath the surface: because of low pay, part-time employment and broken 
working lives, only a quarter of women reaching pension age now are entitled to a full 
basic state pension. This figure will not reach 80% until 2025, leaving many older women 
in poverty for the foreseeable future.  New Labour has changed the rules in another key 
way, introducing means-tested tax credits as a solution to poverty for children, for 
workers, for childcare and for pensioners. This brings welcome resources to households 
with low incomes, many headed by women, but dependence on means tests brings well 
established problems of penalties for work and limited take-up. New Labour assumes that 
women can now earn their own security as individuals – rejecting assumptions of male 
breadwinners – but unequal working lives put women at greater risk of poverty.
Gendered power
Gender systems are also systems of power: welfare states affect gender relations, 
women’s autonomy as individuals, their ability to support themselves and their place in 
public politics. Equality legislation has brought women important rights, but inequalities 
in paid work, care, income and time bring unequal voice in households, civil society, 
local politics, state and European governments. In households the continuing gender 
division of labour suggests that women’s voice is weaker, and their lower incomes may 
give them less say in major decisions than men (Sung and Bennett 2007). How far has 
New Labour come in engendering politics, to include the representation of women, to 
make gender equality issues salient in government, and to enable gender equality in 
households.
Women’s representation increased dramatically upon the election of New Labour in 
1997. Feminist action within the party ensured debates about representative politics, and 
brought all-women shortlists. Through these Labour brought its representation of women 
on shortlists and elected MPs to 24% in 1997 (Annesley & Gains 2007). A Women’s 
Minister led responsibility for representing women’s interests in government and cabinet, 
and through a dedicated Women’s Unit (now part of the Government Equalities Office) 
and continued support for the Equal Opportunities Commission (now part of the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission). Policy coalitions, including organizations such as the 
Women’s Budget Group, have put feminist concerns on the agenda at the core of 
government. Devolution brought a new Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, whose 
constitution reflected feminist influences, and enabled selection and electoral systems to 
be used to foster women’s representation. Gender equality in representation has been 
reached in the Welsh Assembly, which is now a world leader in this respect. At the level 
of government in Westminster, women have been represented as Ministers, at around 
30%, but not so well in core positions (Durose & Gains 2007). These amount to 
considerable changes in the representation of women and the likelihood of gender 
equality being taken into account in New Labour government.
Internationally, women’s low level of political representation is being targeted by quotas 
(Dahlerup 2006). Accumulated evidence points to discriminatory processes as the key to 
women’s continued under-representation, rather than women’s choices or poorer 
qualification for election (Phillips 1991). Therefore, solutions may be found through 
changing political processes. Proponents of the parity principle argue representation is 
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not democratic unless both men and women are equally represented. Proposals for gender 
quotas come in many forms, and are designed to ensure a minimum proportion of women 
are elected, or to give parity between men and women. A ‘parity law’ has been used in 
France to regulate the proportion of women candidates in local regional and European 
elections, though not in national parliamentary ones: it increased women’s representation 
from 22 per cent to 47.5 per cent in the cities in March 2001 (Squires and Wickham-
Jones 2001).
Nordic countries are used to being at the top of gender leagues. The long, unbroken 
women’s movement has worked to increase acceptability of stronger women’s 
participation and the unacceptability of men’s over-representation. Women’s stronger 
position in employment, proportional representation, social democratic party dominance 
and party quotas – though not compulsory legal quotas - have increased women’s 
representation in parliament. This has been gradual process built on consensual politics 
over decades. Sweden is still at the top of European countries, with 45% of women 
parliamentarians. But Nordic feminists are now surprised to find their position at the top 
of the international league taken by Rwanda, bringing debates in Scandinavia about 
whether the consensual process has been too gradual (Dahlerup 2006). New parliaments 
in Scotland and Wales have also offered opportunities to build systems in which women 
can win seats in Europe too (albeit at a devolved rather than UK level) and have reached 
50% in Wales, as we have seen. Quotas are rapidly growing as a means to avoid a 
hundred-year wait for women to be fully represented, though they face barriers in some 
developed democracies, particularly those without proportional representation, with 
entrenched male MPs and party selection processes, and where the dominant ideology is 
based on liberal ideals emphasizing equal opportunity rather than equality of result.
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
Table 4 compares women’s position in government, politics and civil service with other 
selected countries. The UK is around the EU average, and well below Sweden, which has 
40% women or more in each category here. The UK political system has been highly 
resistant to the representation of women, and to the inclusion of a gender equality 
politics. Women have acted through the labour party, which had been dominated by class 
inequality rather than gender inequality. They have made important gains in representing
women and women’s interests at all levels, from local government through central state 
institutions, civil society organisations, European and national parliaments to the core 
institutions of the central state – especially the Treasury – where key decisions are more 
likely to be made. There has been a serious transformation of the business of government, 
but not serious enough, while women have to be content with around 30% of ministerial 
positions and 20% of MPs, and while agendas contradicting gender equality – such as the 
spread of free markets in public services – have been flourishing (Rummery et al 2007).
Conclusion
This chapter has asked how far New Labour has shifted from the male breadwinner 
model of gender inequality? What have been the limits, and what might be priorities for a 
more radical assault on inequalities in work, care, income, time and power?  Change 
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there has been, in assumptions about mothers’ place in the labour market, and the need 
for social support for work-family reconciliation. Policy for mothers’ employment –
including childcare - has been a key government priority. But policies for gender equality 
in care, time, income and power have been more muted. Neo-liberal ideology has also 
reduced the impact of gender equality policies. Continuing social inequalities affect the 
degree to which women have access to quality jobs, childcare, control over time and 
security.
Social democratic regimes with high social spending are clearly the most successful for 
gender equality (Lewis 1992). Where care work is supported by social spending, women 
are more likely to have full-time continuous employment, and be able to reconcile work 
with family responsibilities. Can governments afford gender equality if it means social 
spending?  Academic social policy has for some time debated different welfare regimes 
and argued the superiority of the social democratic model: ‘Far from being “horses for 
courses”, the social democratic welfare regime turns out to be the best choice’ whatever 
the goal (Goodin et al 1999: 260). Measuring child well-being in rich countries, on a 
wide range of measures, Unicef (2007) shows the UK leaving more children in poverty
than all the other countries covered, while Scandinavian countries are the highest 
achievers. An account of economic indicators concludes that: ‘the best performing 
industrial economies at the beginning of the 21st century are those that have least in 
common with the neo-liberal model’: the Scandinavian social democracies in particular 
(Panić 2007). Perhaps our government cannot afford not to adopt a more social 
democratic stance and the gender equality that goes with it?
A universal citizenship model, in which both men and women have obligations to care 
and rights to support as carers, would increase gender equality and bring social and 
economic benefits to children and adults. Social support for childcare is a pre-requisite: 
especially a more comprehensive provision for pre-school children, beyond the 2 ½ hour 
day.  Policies towards involving men in care are needed: innovative parental leave 
policies (mainly Scandinavian) are about changing gender relations at home. Policies 
towards more equal time are necessary if women are to earn enough to ensure their own 
security. Women cannot be expected to keep themselves out of poverty in old age if they 
have unequal working lives. A universal citizenship model might go further than 
Scandinavian countries in enabling men’s lives to be more like women’s. We need 
policies around employment, but a wider agenda, and a more social democratic model, 
would shift us from the male breadwinner model in practice as well as in ideology.
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Tables
Table 1: Female and male employment rates, as percentage of women and







Sweden 70.4 74.4  4.0
Denmark 71.9 79.8  7.9
Slovenia 61.3 70.4  9.1
Hungary 51.0 63.1 12.1
France 57.6 68.8 11.2
UK 65.9 77.6 11.7
Ireland 58.3 76.9 18.6
Malta 33.7 73.8 40.1
EU 27 56.0 70.8 14.8
Source: Eurostat structural indicators Europa NewCronos website 2006 and author’s 
calculations
                                                
1 The employment rates are calculated by dividing the number of women aged 15 to 64 in employment by 
the total female population of the same age group. The indicator is based on the EU Labour Force Survey. 
The survey covers the entire population living in private households and excludes those in collective 
households such as boarding houses, halls of residence and hospitals. Employed population consists of 
those persons who during the reference week did any work for pay or profit for at lease one hour, or were 
not working but had jobs from which they were temporarily absent.
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Plantenga & Siegel 2005 (drawing on Eurostat and national sources)
ILO Examples of leave provisions for fathers (Conditions of Work and Employment 
Programme website)
                                                
1 The length is weighted to reflect the level of payment
2Non-harmonised data are used because they include the UK. When harmonized to take 
account of availability of leave, Sweden’s coverage is 100% for 0-3 year-olds and 90% 
for 3- compulsory school age: Swedish parents take around 14 months paid leave on 
average.
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Sweden 39.6 11.5 3.4: 1 40 40
Denmark 33.0 12.7 2.1: 1 40 38
Slovenia 11.1  7.2 1.5: 1 42 41
Hungary  5.8   2.7 2.1: 1 41 40
Netherlands 75.1 22.6 3.3: 1 39 38
France 30.7  5.7 5.4: 1 40 38
UK 42.7 10.4 4.1: 1 44 40
Malta 21.1  4.5 4.7: 1 42 39
EU 25 32.4  7.4 4.4: 1 41 39
Source: European Commission/Eurostat 2007 Living conditions in Europe (Table 3.2: 46, 
Table 3.4: 50)) and author’s calculations.
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Sweden 50 48 36 39
Slovenia  6 13 24 47
Hungary 14 10  11 19
France 13 13  21 32
UK 30 20 25 20
Ireland 21 12  13 10
Malta 15  9
Average EU 25 24 23
Source: European Commission Database on Women and Men in Decision-making 2006
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